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A B S T R A C T
With aging populations, the role of private insurance in financing late-in-life risks is likely to grow. Yet, demand
for long-term care insurance (LTCI) and life annuities (hereafter annuities) is very limited and lags behind
economic projections. This systematic literature review surveys the large number of theoretical and empirical
studies analyzing this contradiction. We examine the LTCI and annuity puzzles separately and show which
factors limit demand for insurance against both late-in-life risks. Our systematic search rendered 3,945 unique
hits and findings of 187 studies were integrated in our analyses. Results hereof suggest that holding of both
insurance products is systematically impeded by substitution by social security, adverse selection, nonstandard
preferences and limited rationality due to low financial literacy and risk unawareness. Furthermore, insurance
holding is concentrated among wealthier and subjectively healthier individuals. A comprehensive approach
addressing all four reasons for low uptake may increase insurance holding most effectively and may particularly
empower people with lower socio-economic status to make well-informed decisions.
Introduction
Facing aging populations, many developed countries strive to pro-
tect against late-in-life risks through policies that ensure adequate el-
derly care and retirement income. Yet fiscal affordability of such po-
licies is simultaneously impeded by these demographics. Consequently,
the role of public policy in protecting against long-term care (LTC) and
longevity risks remains small in countries where government policies
have traditionally been limited and is decreasing in countries where
extensive public programs are being constricted. Hence, social benefits
for LTC and longevity risks often provide a minimalist safety net for the
worst-off, while others need to buy private insurance to cover those
risks.
Limited coverage of public programs and the considerable in-
dividual uncertainty about late-in-life risks provide a strong rationale
for buying private insurance. Indeed, a market with limited government
intervention offers ample freedom to deploy resources and smooth
consumption over one’s life-cycle. Individuals can purchase a preferred
amount of insurance coverage at a preferred point in time, e.g., when
income and assets are high to protect against depleting assets due to
late-in-life risks when income is lower. Yet in practice, private in-
surance against LTC and longevity risks lags behind economic projec-
tions. The uptake of long-term care insurance (LTCI) is much lower than
predicted by standard economic (expected utility) theory (Pestieau and
Ponthière, 2012). Similarly, economic theory judges that life annuities
(hereafter annuities) should play a larger role in insuring against long-
evity risks than is observed in the current market (Modigliani, 1986).
In response, for both distinct but related markets a broad literature
has emerged to explain why such underinsurance exists. This research
has analyzed both the supply side of the market, where existing in-
surance products may suffer from design flaws and the demand-side,
where people may fail to adequately purchase these products. We focus
on demand-side analyses and group this literature into four explana-
tions. First, people could substitute for private insurance with public
insurance or family help (e.g., Brown et al., 2007b). Second, people
could have private information about their LTC and longevity risk that
risk-rated insurance premiums do not control for. Then primarily the
worst risks adversely select into LTCI and annuities, driving up pre-
miums and lowering demand among better risks (e.g., Sloan and
Norton, 1997). Third, people could have different preferences than
those assumed in expected utility models (e.g., Brown et al., 2012).
Fourth, behavior of limited rationality not reflected in expected utility
evaluations could impact uptake. For example, when people are not
perfectly rational, factors such as financial literacy may impact uptake
(e.g., Brown, 2007).
To evaluate why uptake of LTCI and annuities is so low our paper
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provides an overview of all factors impacting LTCI and annuity pur-
chase decisions. To date, the only extensive review in the fast growing
field of literature on LTCI evaluates three major research areas (finan-
cing, demand, and insurability) by identifying the most significant
paths in a citation network (Eling and Ghavibazoo, 2019). By contrast,
our review provides a more in-depth analysis of the potential ex-
planations for low uptake of LTCI – including more than twice as many
empirical studies on LTCI uptake – while simultaneously providing a
similar analysis for low uptake of annuities. Hence, our contribution to
the literature is fourfold. First, we provide a systematic review of the
literature on demand for LTCI and annuities with quality checks (rather
than a structured review). Second, we provide overviews of the theo-
retical and empirical literature separately and for both fields of study.
Third, we move beyond summarizing previous results by employing our
descriptive results to unravel the underlying reasons for low uptake.
Fourth, we compare the reasons for low uptake in both markets.
Our article continues as follows. Section “Background” gives an
overview of the main LTCI and annuity markets and products. Section
“Methods” describes the state-of-the art methods of our systematic re-
view. Section “Theoretical literature” integrates the findings of previous
theoretical research. Section “Empirical literature” summarizes the
findings of empirical research and uses these to explain why uptake of
LTCI and annuities is so low. Section “Discussion” discusses to what
extent the factors that lead to low uptake for LTCI and annuities
overlap. Finally, our conclusion and recommendations follow in Section
“Conclusion and recommendations”.
Background
The uptake of private LTCI differs greatly between countries, in part
because there are large differences between social security schemes.
Still, private LTCI markets do not necessarily thrive in countries with
less generous social security schemes. In the US, for example, LTCI is
the primary risk sharing mechanism for many individuals as Medicaid –
the public insurance scheme – only provides a means-tested safety net
for the lowest income groups. Nonetheless, the American LTCI market
covers just a fraction of the total LTC expenditures (Brown and
Finkelstein, 2007). In the UK, private LTCI is almost absent, notwith-
standing the fact that LTC provided by local authorities is also strin-
gently means-tested.
Private LTCI in France and Germany is generally seen to be more
successful (Doty et al., 2015; Rothgang, 2010). In these countries, LTCI
is marketed as a supplement to (income adjusted) social insurance
policies. Supplemental LTCI policies are also available in Israel and
Singapore (Swiss Re, 2014). The downside is that these are bare-bone
policies do not nearly cover the costs of LTC and offer limited relief
from pressure on public expenditures. Nonetheless, such meagre po-
licies are viewed to be more marketable. With social security protecting
against tail-risks, supplemental policies are both more affordable and
less prone to uncertain developments of future LTC costs than more
comprehensive insurance products.
Similarly, annuity markets are hardly ever substantial, even in case
of more extensive social security settings (Rusconi, 2008). Generally,
we can distinguish two types of annuity products. First there are im-
mediate annuities, in which annuitants are almost immediately entitled
to receive annuity income after paying a lump-sum. Such policies are
the predominant form of longevity insurance in e.g., the UK, the US and
Australia. Second, there are deferred annuities, in which annuitants pay
periodic premiums in advance and will start receiving annuity pay-
ments at some point in the future. These policies are the conventional
type of longevity insurance in countries such as Germany, Denmark and
the Netherlands. The main difference between both types is that, in the
purchase of immediate annuities, (pension) savings are converted at
once to buy an annuity which starts paying out immediately, whereas
deferred annuities are purchased through iterative premiums that are
converted to future entitlements. Although they differ, neither annuity
product is particularly popular in a voluntary setting and when pension
savings become available people seem inclined to opt for lump-sum
payments rather than annuity payments (Brown et al., 2007a).
To some extent LTCI and annuity markets overlap, because of the
availability of combined products. In the US, some products currently
offer a LTC rider on top of an immediate annuity. LTC needs can be paid
with this annuity and if not all annuity assets are depleted, the re-
mainder will be paid out as death benefits (NAIC, 2016). Deferred an-
nuity hybrids are also available, yet less popular. The uptake of these
new products seems to outperform that of conventional annuities
(NAIC, 2016). In Germany, similar products are available, yet their
commercial success is unknown (Zhou-Richter and Gründl, 2011).
Methods
We performed a systematic literature review based on state-of-the-
art methods (Higgins and Green, 2011). Thus, we (1) formulated a
protocol with clear research questions and eligibility criteria before-
hand; (2) approached an information specialist to develop a highly
sensitive search string and search the relevant databases; (3) performed
the study selection collaboratively; (4) searched relevant working paper
databases manually, snowballed reference lists of all included pub-
lications and approached experts to ensure the integrality of the in-
cluded studies; (5) used a data extraction form that was developed ex
ante; (6) graded all included studies based on the strength of their
methodology and study design in order to assess the risk of biased re-
sults; and (7) integrated the results. Below, we describe this process in-
depth.
(1) In the protocol, we laid down the following research questions:
(i) which factors impact the uptake of LTCI? and (ii) which factors
impact the uptake of life annuities? To be included, publications
should:
1. be explicitly about private LTCI, annuities and/or combined life care
annuities;
2. focus on uptake and/or demand of these products;
3. identify factors that impact demand;
4. be either empirical or theoretical;
5. when empirical, be on high income countries as defined by the
World Bank (2018)
6. when theoretical, be the most recent available applying the specific
model;
7. be in English; and
8. be published in a peer-reviewed journal.
(2) A comprehensive search strategy was developed with the help of
an information specialist of the Erasmus Medical Center Library. We
defined keywords as well as Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) and
Embase Subject Headings (Emtree terms) that captured the first two
eligibility criteria: a focus on LTCI and/or annuity demand. In order to
maximize the identification of potentially relevant publications, we
designed the search string to be highly sensitive by including keywords
with few (relevant) hits (see Appendix A).
This search string was then used to search a combination of general
databases, namely: EMBASE, Medline Ovid, and Web of Science. A
general search string was additionally entered in Google Scholar and
the first 400 hits were recorded. This combination of database searches
was suggested by Bramer et al. (2017b). Following their re-
commendations we also added the following subject specific databases:
CINAHL EBSCOhost (nursing care), PsychINFO Ovid (psychology), ABI
inform Proquest (general non-medical) and EconLit (economics). The
search was performed on July 3rd 2018 and resulted in 3,945 records to
be included in this literature review. A complete overview of the study
selection process can be found in Figure B1.
(3) Titles and abstracts of the identified records were stored in
EndNote and reviewed simultaneously by both authors following
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Bramer et al. (2017a). We scanned the abstracts specifically to identify
publications on factors impacting LTCI and annuity uptake decisions as
defined in the eligibility criteria. This resulted in the inclusion of 341
publications for full text reading, in which the eligibility criteria from
our protocol were applied.
(4) We employed three additional data collection sources to mini-
mize the risk of overlooking potentially relevant publications. First, we
manually searched the working-paper series of the NBER, Netspar,
Cepar, the Pension Research Council and SHARE from 2006 onwards to
identify papers that met eligibility criteria 1 to 7, but which had not yet
been published in a peer-reviewed journal. Second, we similarly
snowballed reference lists of all articles and working papers included.
Third, five experts reflected on the list of included publications and
indicated whether any relevant studies were still missing. In this way,
we ultimately included a total of 187 studies of which 106 empirical
and 81 theoretical.
(5) Relevant data were extracted from the included studies using the
predefined data extraction form. This data extraction – which focused
on either the most extensive analyses performed or the preferred spe-
cification identified by the authors – derived the outcome variable used,
the independent variables analyzed, the corresponding associations and
whether these were significant at a 5 percent significance level. As our
goal is to gain an overview of the directional associations found across
different studies – and not to perform a meta-analysis – we do not report
strength of association. For empirical studies, we also retrieved the
dataset used, the sample size, and the sampling restrictions.
(6) We performed additional quality checks, in order to safeguard
the quality of the included studies and incorporate quality aspects in
our review. Publications were scored on a scale from A (best) to D
(worst) using the relevant measures from the GRADE method
(Schünemann et al., 2013). Specifically, an initial grade was based on
study design, with quasi-experiments (B) ranking above observational
studies (C) and other means of data collection (D). Points were then
deducted for study limitations and publication biases. Studies that
scored malus points in excess of rank D, were excluded retrospectively.
In total, 19 studies have been excluded because of quality issues (see
Figure B1). The main reason for exclusion was that studies failed to
(properly) apply multivariate analyses and hence reported monocausal
results. As such, all studies included contained multivariate analyses.
(7) We combine findings of both theoretical and empirical literature
as follows. For theoretical research, we integrate these by describing the
main findings on LTCI (Section “Demand for LTCI”) and annuity uptake
(Section “Demand for annuities”). This overview is not intended to
compare theoretical predictions based on underlying assumptions, but
rather to shed light on the different factors impacting insurance uptake
that the theoretical literature provides. For empirical research, we
employ a vote count to give an overview of the results of included
studies (Section “Empirical literature”). We pay particular attention to
the strongest level of evidence (B) that results from quasi-experimental
studies evaluating causal relationships. For both theoretical and em-
pirical papers we distinguish between individual level characteristics
(e.g., age, gender and income) and contextual characteristics (e.g., so-
cial benefits and taxes) that could impact uptake. After presenting our
integrated results, we discuss how the findings can explain low uptake
through substitution, adverse selection, insurance preferences and
limited rationality for LTCI (Section “Why is LTCI uptake so low?”) and
annuities (Section “Why is annuity uptake so low?”). Finally, we show
which factors impact uptake of both products in Section “Discussion”.
Theoretical literature
Demand for LTCI
Standard insurance theory in its simplest form posits that LTCI is
valuable for those who are risk averse (i.e., with a concave utility
function). Such a risk averse individual prefers the certainty provided
by insurance coverage over the uncertainty of facing an uninsured risk
and is willing to pay a premium to attain such certainty. However,
uptake of LTCI as predicted by standard insurance theory is much
higher than as observed in practice. Hence, researchers have sought to
expand and adjust the model to fit actual market conditions better. Here
we provide an overview of the main demand-side adaptions of the basic
model.
First, people may rely on several substitutes for LTCI. At the in-
dividual level, private LTCI can be crowded out by informal care (De
Donder and Pestieau, 2017). Potentially, LTCI can be crowded out by
home equity as well. If home equity is illiquid, individuals may have to
sell their house in order to pay for LTC. If reverse mortgages ensure that
home equity is more liquid, then individuals could use these assets to
purchase LTCI without directly selling their house (Davidoff, 2010,
2009; Shao et al., 2017). At the contextual level, private LTCI can be
crowded out by means-tested public LTCI (Fabel, 1996; Pauly, 1990).
Brown and Finkelstein (2008) predict that this is particularly the case
for individuals with lower wealth levels. Friedberg, Sun and Webb
(2014) extend these findings.1 Still, policy interventions that protect
against spending down – such as partnership programs – are predicted
to barely increase LTCI uptake and to mostly benefit those who would
purchase private LTCI anyway (Sun and Webb, 2013).
Second, it is argued that individuals with high LTC needs will ad-
versely select into LTCI. For example, if young individuals have a low
probability of needing LTC they will prefer to purchase LTCI later to
avoid a loss in expected income (Meier, 1999). Consequently, only
older individuals and those with high LTC risks will purchase LTCI.
Even if insurers risk-rate premiums – by for example using age as a
proxy of LTC risk – this will not reflect all private information on LTC
risks that individuals possess and adverse selection could persist.
Third, individual preferences could deviate from those assumed in
the standard bare bones insurance model based on expected utility
theory. For example, it has been suggested– contrary to what is usually
assumed – that marginal utility of consumption in a period of LTC needs
is lower, than in a period of good health (Finkelstein et al., 2009). If
that is the case, then LTCI is less attractive because it shifts consump-
tion from a period with high marginal utility to a period with lower
marginal utility (Meier, 1998). Furthermore, individuals may under-
estimate their LTC risk. Such probability underweighting (De Donder
and Leroux, 2014) may ensure a lower valuation of insurance and de-
crease LTCI demand.
Additionally, family dynamics are expected to impact LTCI demand.
Bequest motives can make LTCI more attractive, as these encourage
individuals to protect their wealth (Lockwood, 2014). At the same time,
buying LTCI can decrease informal caregiving and may therefore be
unattractive even in view of bequest motives (e.g., Pauly, 1990; Zweifel
and Strüwe, 1996, 1998). This suggests that if people prefer informal
care they may strategically decide not to buy LTCI in order to increase
informal caregiving.
Demand for annuities
For annuities, the seminal work of Yaari (1965) shows that an in-
dividual who (1) maximizes a time separable utility; (2) faces un-
certainty about the timing of death only; and (3) has no bequest motive,
should fully annuitize at actuarial fair prices. Subsequent theoretical
research has analyzed whether different assumptions could explain why
actual uptake is lower. For example, in a well-known extension
Davidoff et al. (2005) show that the results of Yaari (1965) hold under
less strict utility assumptions, but do not hold when insurance markets
are incomplete. In this theoretical overview, we summarize the main
1 This is likely at least partly due to affordability. Ma and Sun (2017) show
that cheaper policies that protect only against tail-risks would increase private
LTCI coverage among those with lower wealth levels.
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demand-side extensions on Yaari (1965).
First, just as for LTCI, substitution has been highlighted as an ex-
planation for low uptake. At the individual level, multiple studies show
that families can rely on various substitutes for formal annuities. Some
identify couples as a potential group for whom annuities might be less
valuable, because they inherently already pool risks between them-
selves (Brown and Poterba, 2000). Similarly, others show that longevity
risks can be pooled efficiently by families (Schmeiser and Post, 2005;
Stamos, 2008). At the contextual level, substitution can also occur:
social benefits can crowd out private annuities (Pashchenko, 2013;
Purcal and Piggott, 2008). Moreover, social benefits can particularly
deter individuals with shorter life expectancy from entering the annuity
market and thus aggravate adverse selection effects (Heijdra et al.,
2015; Walliser, 2000).
In addition, a broad range of papers has argued that the design of
current annuity products is suboptimal, which may encourage substitutional
strategies.2 In addition, Kingston and Thorp (2005) show that – as annui-
tization is often irreversible – not annuitizing offers valuable flexibility
through retention of the option to annuitize later on. Other studies show
that annuitization is only valuable from a certain age (or wealth level).
Moreover, self-annuitization (e.g., Milevsky, 1998; Stabile, 2006; Milevsky
and Young, 2007b) or other investments (Di Giacinto and Vigna, 2012) may
better protect the liquidity of assets and may be optimal until a certain age
(or wealth threshold) and depending on the returns offered by other in-
vestments (Hainaut and Devolder, 2006). Studies allowing for flexible in-
vestment portfolios over time derive qualitatively similar results (Horneff
et al., 2008a,b; Milevsky and Young, 2007a).
Second, adverse selection can play a role just as for LTCI; if risk-
rated premiums do not reflect private information, only those with the
worst risks will purchase annuities. Indeed, it is argued that individuals
infer such private information on their longevity risk from their health
status (e.g., Gupta and Li, 2013). Mitchell et al. (1999) show that prices
are higher due to adverse selection, but with realistic parameters this
cannot explain low uptake for estimated loading factors. Balls (2006)
draws qualitatively similar conclusions and shows that adverse selec-
tion based on health status both decreases the value of annuities on the
market and shrinks the market size.
Third, people can have different preferences than those assumed in
the Yaari (1965) model. As for LTCI, at the individual level a common
extension has been to introduce bequest motives (e.g., Kotlikoff and
Spivak (1981)). Davidoff et al. (2005) show that under fair premiums it
is still optimal to annuitize all wealth, except for the part that one
wishes to bequeath. Still, under unfair premiums bequest motives can
eliminate demand (Friedman and Warshawsky, 1990; Vidal-Meliá and
Lejárraga-García, 2006, 2004). Bequest motives need not be strong;
demand can be eliminated by modest bequest motives (Lockwood,
2012) or even by any positive bequest motive if an individual is suffi-
ciently risk averse (Bommier and Grand, 2014). As for LTCI, it is also
argued that parents may strategically purchase annuities (Bernheim
et al., 1985). Specifically, parents may use bequests to influence be-
havior of their children. For example, they could decrease their bequest
(or threaten to) by purchasing nonbequeathable annuities to stimulate
their children to give them more attention.
Finally, uncertainty over future health costs may be important.
Annuities may be used to hedge against the uncertain costs of health
shocks when older (Ai et al., 2017; Pang and Warshawsky, 2008). Yet,
health risks may also impose liquidity constraints by requiring extra
savings or insurance spending at a younger age and limit the assets
available for annuitizing (Peijnenburg et al., 2017; Reichling and
Smetters, 2015). Moreover, if longevity and health costs are negatively
correlated – i.e., if a negative health shock leads to higher health costs
while decreasing longevity – this provides a hedge for both un-
certainties and decreases annuitization (Zhao, 2015).
Empirical literature
Uptake of LTCI
An extensive empirical literature analyzes LTCI uptake in different
countries. A descriptive overview of this research and the data analyzed
is presented in Table 1. A large share of the LTCI literature analyzes one
or more of the 12 waves of the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
Moreover, many studies focus on the ‘near elderly’ – usually between 50
and 70 years old – who are not in need of care as those individuals
should be preparing for later. Of the 62 studies included, most (42) are
observational studies without serious limitations (graded C). 5 studies
are quasi-experimental (B), and 15 are observational studies that suffer
from some limitations or fail to comprehensively describe their methods
for data collection (D).
As for the dependent variable of LTCI uptake, different measurements
are used throughout the empirical literature. Large longitudinal surveys
such as the HRS or the Survey of Health Aging and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE) elicit revealed preferences by asking for ownership status which is
occasionally used to determine changes in ownership status (both pur-
chasing and lapsing). For example, the HRS asks respondents: “Not in-
cluding government programs, do you now have any long-term care in-
surance which specifically covers nursing home care for a year or more or
any part of personal or medical care in your home?” Other studies have
measure stated preferences, through willingness to pay elicitation, discrete
choice experiments (Brau et al., 2010; Brau and Bruni, 2008) or refer-
endum-approaches (Costa-Font and Font, 2009; Costa-Font and Rovira-
Forns, 2008). When revealed and stated preference analyses systematically
lead to qualitatively different results, we reflect on this in our interpretation.
Generally, however, this is not the case.
Individual factors
Table 2 summarizes the main findings of the empirical studies on
individual factors associated with LTCI uptake. We refer to Table C8 for
a granular insight into our data, as it shows exactly which studies have
found which associations and distinguishes between revealed and
stated preferences. Below we reflect on these factors one-by-one.
Most studies either find that women are more likely to buy or own
LTCI (35 percent) or that there are no significant differences in uptake
between men and women (54 percent). Notably, there are differences
between studies that analyze stated preferences and those that analyze
revealed preferences; most hypothetical studies find no association with
gender, whereas studies analyzing actual uptake, ownership and lap-
sing do. This overall positive association matches with the fact that
LTCI is of more value for women as they live longer than men and are
more likely to outlive their partner. This especially applies since
gender-based premium differentiation in insurance products is for-
bidden in the EU (European Union, 2004) and has only recently been
introduced for LTCI in the US (Carrns, 2014).
The relationship between LTCI uptake and age is less straightfor-
ward, with 22 percent of the included studies finding negative asso-
ciations and 30 percent reporting positive associations. Moreover, these
results should be interpreted with caution as they may reflect cohort
effects for studies that employ age-cohorts such as the HRS. Some
studies additionally incorporate effects of age squared. These generally
report a significantly positive (Konetzka and Luo, 2011) or negative
sign (Bernet, 2004; Courbage and Roudaut, 2008; Gousia, 2016; Mellor,
2001, 2000), with only two studies finding no significant squared age
2 Part of this research focuses on strategies or products that are either very
recent innovations or that do not yet exist in practice and as such do not explain
underannuitization. We will therefore suffice by referring the reader to some of
this literature. Specifically on: annuity options (Sheshinsky, 2010), on products
that concentrate on late-life payouts (Scott et al., 2011) and withdrawal rules
(e.g., Dus, Maurer and Mitchell, 2005; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, et al., 2008).
Finally, some recent studies analyze optimal combinations of innovative pro-
ducts and withdrawal strategies (e.g., Blanchett, 2015; Hanewald, Piggott and
Sherris, 2013).
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Table 1
Overview of included studies on LTCI uptake.
Authors # Dataset Country N Sample restrictions
Akaichi, Costa-Font and Frank
(2019)
1 Survey of Long-term Care
Awareness and Planning
US 15,298 ind. 40 – 70 years old and not
institutionalized
Allaire, Brown and Wiener (2016) 2 Survey of Long-term Care
Awareness and Planning
US 12,936 ind. 40 – 70 years old and not
institutionalized
Ameriks, Briggs, Caplin, Shapiro
and Tonetti (2018)
3 Survey US 1,086 ind. over 55 years old with at least $10K in
Vanguard accounts
Barnett and Stum (2013) 4 Survey US 803 ind. public employees eligible to purchase
LTCI
Bergquist, Costa-Font and Swartz
(2018)†
5 NAIC sales US 50 states + DC n.a.
Bernet (2004) 6 HRS (wave 5) US 16,851 ind. over 53 years old
Boyer, De Donder, Fluet, Leroux
and Michaud (2017)
7 Survey Canada 2,000 ind. 50 – 70 years old
Brau and Bruni (2008) 8 Survey Italy 1,176 ind. 25 – 70 years old
Brau, Bruni and Pinna (2010) 9 Survey Italy 1,176 ind. 25 – 70 years old
Brown et al. (2007b)† 10 HRS (wave 3 – 5) US 12,402 ind. 55 – 69 years old
Brown et al. (2012) 11 American Life Panel US 1,569 ind. over 50 years old
Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014) 12 Socio-Economic Panel Germany 3,749 ind. over 35 years old and not in need of care
Caro et al. (2011) 13 HRS (wave 6 – 7) US 2,747 couples married couples with partners both over
65 years old
Chatterjee and Fan (2017) 14 HRS (wave 11) US 21,696 ind. over 52 years old
Coe et al. (2015b) 15 HRS (wave 4 – 8) US 8,349 ind. 51 – 61 years old and not
institutionalized
Cornell and Grabowski (2018)† 16 HRS (wave 3 – 11) US 13,285 ind. 50 – 69 years old
Costa-Font and Font (2009) 17 Survey Spain 324 ind. over 18 years old
Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns
(2008)
18 Survey Spain 324 ind. over 18 years old
Courbage and Roudaut (2008) 19 SHARE (wave 2) France 2,530 ind. over 50 years old
Courtemanche and He (2009)† 20 HRS (wave 4 – 7) US 8,566 ind. 55 – 65 years old
Cramer and Jensen (2006) 21 HRS (wave 6 – 7) US 9,863 ind. over 55 years old and without LTCI
Curry et al. and Kapp (2009) 22 Focus groups and in-depth
interviews
US, CT 6 focus groups of 9 and
32 interviews
having a direct experience with LTCI
Cutler et al. (2008)a 23 AHEAD (wave 2) US 7,183 ind. 65 – 90 years old
Doerpinghaus and Gustavson
(2002)
24 HIAA, AARP and NAIC sales US 50 states + DC n.a.
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) 25 AHEAD (wave 2) US 5,072 ind. over 72 years old
Friedberg et al. (2017) 26 HRS (wave 6 – 11) US 891 ind. over 65 years old and owning LTCI in
2002
Gan et al. (2015) 27 HRS (wave 3 – 5) US 5,000 ind. over 73 years old
Goda (2011)† 28 HRS (wave 3 – 8) US 15,822 ind. 50 – 69 years old
Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015) 29 HRS (wave 11) US 487 ind. over 50 years old
Gousia (2016) 30 SHARE (wave 5) Austria, Italy, France,
Denmark, Israel and Czech
Republic
19,116 ind. over 50 years old
He and Chou (2018) 31 Survey Hong Kong 1,613 ind. over 40 years old
Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016) 32 SHARE (wave 1, 2 and 5) Spain 10,867 obs. over 50 years old and owning either LTCI
or private health insurance
Kennedy et al. (2016) 33 NHIS US 14,393 ind. 40 – 65 years old
Kitajima (1999) 34 Survey Japan, Tokyo 710 ind. over 40 years old
Konetzka and Luo (2011) 35 HRS (wave 3 – 10) US 3,974 ind. over 50 years old and reporting LTCI
ownership in at least one year
Kumar et al. (1995) 36 Survey US 10,489 ind. purchasing LTCI or being approached by
an agent
Li and Jensen (2012) 37 HRS (wave 6 – 9) US 2,085 ind. over 50 years old and reporting LTCI
ownership in at least one year
Lin and Prince (2013) 38 HRS (wave 6 – 10) US 12,695 ind. over 50 years old
Lin and Prince (2016) 39 HRS (wave 6 – 10) US 12,695 ind. over 50 years old
Lutzky and Alecxih (1999) 40 Interviews US 110 ind. experts, insurance agents, consumer
groups and regulators
McCall et al. (1998) 41 Survey US 1,626 ind. 55 – 75 years old
McGarry et al. (2014) 42 NHATS (2011) US 8245 ind. over 65 years old
McGarry et al. (2016) 43 HRS (wave 10) US 12,796 ind. over 50 years old
McGarry et al. (2018) 44 HRS (wave 10) US 15,963 ind. over 50 years old
McNamara and Lee (2004) 45 HRS (wave 3 – 5) US 6,220 ind. over 50 years old and reporting LTCI
ownership in at least one year
Mellor (2000) 46 AHEAD (wave 1) US 8,021 ind. over 70 years old
Mellor (2001) 47 AHEAD (wave 1) US 7,775 ind. over 70 years old
PSD US 1,634 ind. over 50 years old
Nixon (2014) 48 AHIP sales data US 50 states + DC n.a.
Oster et al. (2010) 49 PHAROS and HRS (wave 5) US and Canada 7,356 ind. 26 – 64 years old
Pincus et al. (2017) 50 Survey US 1,305 ind. 30 – 79 years old
Pinquet et al. (2011) 51 Insurance data Spain 150,123 ind. n.a.
Schaber and Stum (2007) 52 Survey US 509 ind. state employees
(continued on next page)
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effects (Ameriks et al., 2018). This may be indicative of an ambiguous
non-linear relationship between age and uptake with the directional
impact of age changing around a certain age. However, studies ana-
lyzing the impact of reaching the age 65 on LTCI uptake find mixed
directional effects (Allaire et al., 2016; Pinquet et al., 2011; Van
Houtven et al., 2015).
Many studies also analyze the association of ethnicity with LTCI
uptake. Although a dichotomous comparison between white and non-
white as reported in Table 2 reveals no clear uptake pattern, compar-
isons with specific ethnicities do. These show that uptake of LTCI is
markedly lower amongst Hispanics.3 At the same time, being black4 or
having another non-white ethnicity5 does not seem to be associated
with LTCI coverage.
Different aspects of socio-economic status seem to be important
determinants of LTCI uptake. Specifically, some studies find a positive
association of subjective social class (He and Chou, 2018) or subjective
economic condition (Kitajima, 1999) and LTCI uptake. More generally,
Table 2 shows that a majority of the studies finds a positive association
between education, income or wealth and LTCI uptake. Evidence sug-
gests that unaffordability of LTCI products may at least partially drive
these associations (Brown et al., 2012; Schaber and Stum, 2007).
Zooming in on income effects, all studies find negative income squared
effects (Bernet, 2004; McNamara and Lee, 2004; Mellor, 2001, 2000).
Together, these findings suggest that income initially enables purchase
of LTCI, but above a certain income level people rely more on self-
insurance. For squared wealth, the same association is found by two
studies (Bernet, 2004; McNamara and Lee, 2004), while two other
studies find no significant squared effects (Mellor, 2001, 2000). Ad-
ditionally, home ownership is associated with lower uptake (Boyer
et al., 2017; Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns, 2008; Stevenson et al., 2009;
Wu et al., 2017), although studies that analyze the home value in ad-
dition to wealth do not find theoretically predicted lower LTCI uptake
(McGarry et al., 2018; Mellor, 2000; Sloan and Norton, 1997).
Family dynamics, which have been extensively debated by theorists,
are found to some extent in LTCI practice. Table 2 shows that bequest
motives are likely associated positively with LTCI uptake.6 Further-
more, being married does not seem to be systematically associated with
LTCI uptake. Having more children may decrease LTCI uptake (33
percent), but the majority of the studies (62 percent) reports no sig-
nificant association. Analysis of other measures of contact with one’s
children, such as their vicinity (Kumar et al., 1995; Unruh et al., 2016),
co-residence (Coe et al., 2015b; He and Chou, 2018) or size of the entire
family (Brau and Bruni, 2008; Costa-Font and Font, 2009; Costa-Font
and Rovira-Forns, 2008; Schaber and Stum, 2007) does not reveal a
clear association with LTCI uptake.
In addition, Table 2 reveals that the subjective risk of needing LTC is
generally positively associated with LTCI demand. In other words, in-
dividuals who think they are at higher risk of needing LTC are also more
likely to buy LTCI. At the same time, self-rated health seems positively
associated with LTCI demand, with one third of the studies finding a
positive association and 61 percent finding no significant association.
This indicates that healthier individuals may be more likely to buy
LTCI. However, these two results are not necessarily contradictory. If
people associate longevity with a higher risk of LTC needs, this may
prompt the observed pattern; subjectively healthier individuals would
expect to live longer and hence expect to have a higher LTC risk
(Cramer and Jensen, 2006). At the same time, there is no evidence that
objective health or subjective longevity is related to demand for LTCI.
Table 2 shows that the number of impairments in ADLs is not as-
sociated with LTCI uptake, despite the fact that ADL impairments are
used for both underwriting and determining benefits eligibility (Cornell
et al., 2016). Similarly, other measures of objective health such as the
number of hospitalizations in the previous year (Brau and Bruni, 2008;
Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014), drug usage (Bernet, 2004), various
existing conditions (e.g., Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014; Gousia,
2016) and BMI (Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016), are not systematically
associated with uptake.
Interestingly, risk aversion does not seem to be associated with in-
surance decisions. At the same time, LTCI uptake increases with ownership
of health insurance (Brau et al., 2010; Brau and Bruni, 2008; Browne and
Zhou-Richter, 2014; Chatterjee and Fan, 2017) and life insurance
(Chatterjee and Fan, 2017; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016; McNamara and Lee,
2004). Some studies argue that preventive health behaviors or wearing
seatbelts may be indicative of risk behavior and show that these are
Table 1 (continued)
Authors # Dataset Country N Sample restrictions
Sloan and Norton (1997) 53 AHEAD (wave 1 – 2) US 5,292 ind. over 70 years old
HRS (wave 1 – 2) US 13,312 ind. 51 – 61 years old
Sperber et al. (2017) 54 Focus groups US 80 ind. elderly parents and adult children
Stevenson et al. (2009) 55 NAIC sales US 50 states + DC n.a.
Stum (2008) 56 Survey US 446 ind. state employees
Swamy (2004) 57 Survey US, MD 1,394 ind. 40 – 70 years old
Tennyson and Yang (2014) 58 CRWB US, NY 693 ind. 50 – 72 years old
Unruh et al. (2016) 59 AHIP/LifePlan US 5,240 ind. purchasing LTCI or being approached by
an agent
Van Houtven et al. (2015) 60 HRS (wave 3 – 10) US 22,742 ind. over 50 years old
Wu, Bateman et al. (2017) 61 Survey Australia 1,008 ind. 55 – 64 years old
Zhou-Richter et al. (2010) 62 Survey Germany 914 ind. adult children
† Quasi-experimental study (highest level of evidence available).
a Also analyzes annuity uptake.
3 Of the 10 studies analyzing this, 1 finds a positive association (Kennedy
et al., 2016), 5 find a negative association (Caro et al., 2011; Konetzka and Luo,
2011; McGarry et al., 2016, 2014; McNamara and Lee, 2004), and 4 find no
association (Cramer and Jensen, 2006; Li and Jensen, 2012; McGarry et al.,
2018; Stevenson et al., 2009)
4 Of the 12 studies analyzing this, 4 find a positive association (Kennedy et al.,
2016; McGarry et al., 2018; Stevenson et al., 2009; Van Houtven et al., 2015), 3
find a negative association (Caro et al., 2011; Konetzka and Luo, 2011; Li and
Jensen, 2012), and 5 find no statistically significant association (Cramer and
Jensen, 2006; McGarry et al., 2016, 2014; McNamara and Lee, 2004; Swamy,
2004).
5 Of the 8 studies analyzing this, 2 find a negative association (McGarry et al.,
2018, 2016) and 6 find no statistically significant association (Konetzka and
Luo, 2011; Li and Jensen, 2012; McNamara and Lee, 2004; Stevenson et al.,
2009; Swamy, 2004; Van Houtven et al., 2015).
6 This relationship is even more clear for bequest expectations, as all studies
that analyze bequest expectations find a positive association with LTCI uptake
(Courbage and Roudaut, 2008; Konetzka and Luo, 2011; McGarry et al., 2018,
2016), Yet, this could also be driven by reverse causality.
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positively associated with LTCI uptake (Finkelstein andMcGarry, 2006; Gan
et al., 2015; Gottlieb and Mitchell, 2015; McGarry et al., 2018, 2016).
However, other risk behaviors (smoking, drinking and exercising) are not
found to have an effect on uptake (e.g., Courbage and Roudaut, 2008;
Gottlieb and Mitchell, 2015; Jiménez-Martín et al., 2016). Altogether, this
suggests that although risk aversion is unrelated with LTCI uptake, real life
measures of more general insurance preferences or risk behaviors may be
associated with LTCI uptake.
Furthermore, there is evidence that LTCI uptake varies with in-
dividual perceptions of the value of LTCI7 and preferences for LTC. That
is, people who dislike informal care are more likely to take out LTCI, as
displayed in Table 2. People who prefer to stay home to going to a
nursing home are less likely to buy LTCI (McCall et al., 1998; Tennyson
and Yang, 2014). And people who have a negative view of public care
may buy more LTCI (Brau and Bruni, 2008), although another study
finds no significant association (Ameriks et al., 2018). Similarly, people
may well prefer freedom offered by private LTCI with voluntary cov-
erage to public insurance with mandatory coverage (Akaichi et al.,
2019). In line with this, Sperber et al. (2017) find that LTCI is perceived
to support autonomy in arranging LTC and that expectations of future
autonomy influence uptake decisions. This may also be reflected in the
fact that valuing planning may increase uptake (Unruh et al., 2016),
even though other studies find no significant effect (Gousia, 2016; He
and Chou, 2018). Finally, Table 2 shows that people who trust their
insurer to pay out future claims, are more likely to take out LTCI.
Measures of product understanding seem to be strongly associated
with LTCI uptake according to Table 2. Financial literacy – measured as
knowledge of percentages, compound interest, inflation and/or risk
diversification – appears to be positively associated with LTCI demand.
Also, having a financial planner (Kumar et al., 1995; McCall et al.,
1998)8 or working in finance (Lin and Prince, 2016) seems to be as-
sociated with uptake. At the same time, measures of cognitive intact-
ness such as the ability to count backwards or remember the current
president are not associated with different levels of uptake, nor is
knowledge of the LTC system (e.g., knowledge of nursing home costs
(Boyer et al., 2017; Unruh et al., 2016)). Finally, two qualitative studies
highlight the importance of access to information on LTC in decision
making for LTCI (Curry et al., 2009; Lutzky and Alecxih, 1999).
Salience of LTC risks is also important in LTCI uptake. A risk is said
to be salient when one has been previously confronted with it and is
more aware of the risk because of that experience. Most studies show
that various proxies of awareness – such as having discussed LTC, being
adequately informed and knowing of LTCI existence – are associated
positively with demand. However, it is unclear whether these results
imply a causal relationship or show that people who purchase LTCI are
simply more aware of LTC risks because of that purchase. An indirect
way of analyzing this relationship further, is by looking at LTC ex-
perience, e.g., providing informal care to others or having close re-
latives needing LTC. The available evidence suggests that this may be
positively associated with LTCI uptake, as 42 percent of the studies find
a positive association and 47 percent find no significant association.
Moreover, individuals who have experienced health shocks – whether
positive or negative – are more likely to own LTCI (Konetzka and Luo,
2011), which may also suggest that awareness of LTC risks increases
uptake. In addition, over or underweighting the risk of needing LTC
could further impact uptake (Boyer et al., 2017).
Contextual factors
At the contextual level, Table 3 highlights the importance of both
generosity of social benefits and tax incentives for LTCI uptake (see
Table C9 for an in-depth overview). The evidence – including one quasi-
experimental study – shows that more lenient means-tested social
benefits schemes either decrease LTCI demand or have no effect.9 On
the contrary, tax incentives10 (and consequently lower prices) lead to
greater willingness to insure, according to three quasi-experimental
Table 2
Overview of findings by studies on individual factors associated with LTCI
uptake.
Factor Association Total
Negative None Positive
# % # % # % #
Demographics
Femalea 4 11% 20 54% 13 35% 37
Age 8 22% 18 49% 11 30% 37
Non-whiteb 1 6% 13 81% 2 13% 16
Socio-economic status
Education 2 7% 10 33% 18 60% 30
Income 0 0% 14 39% 22 61% 36
Home ownership 2 50% 2 50% 0 0% 4
Wealth 1 4% 10 37% 16 59% 27
Family
Number of childrencd 7 33% 13 62% 1 5% 21
Marriedde 3 9% 25 78% 4 13% 32
Bequest motive 0 0% 4 57% 3 43% 7
Subjective risk
Subjective health 2 6% 19 61% 10 32% 31
Subjective LTC riskf 0 0% 5 26% 14 74% 19
Subjective longevity 0 0% 6 100% 0 0% 6
Objective risk
ADL impairments 1 6% 14 78% 3 17% 18
Preferences
Risk aversion 2 29% 3 43% 2 29% 7
Formal care preference 0 0% 0 0% 3 100% 3
Trust in insurers 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 2
Understanding
Financial literacy 1 20% 0 0% 4 80% 5
System knowledge 0 0% 4 80% 1 20% 5
Cognitive intactness 0 0% 3 75% 1 25% 4
Salience
Awareness of LTC risks 0 0% 3 38% 5 63% 8
LTC experienceg 2 11% 9 47% 8 42% 19
a Discrepancy in results of stated and revealed preferences studies.
b Seven studies report different associations for “black”, “Hispanic” and/or
“other” and have been counted under “none”.
c Three studies report having children (or not) rather than the number of
children.
d Four studies report household size and have been counted under both children
and married.
e Three studies report different associations for married individuals compared
to individuals who are single, divorced, or widowed and have been counted
under “none”.
f Two studies reporting different associations for home care and nursing home
expectations have been counted under “none”.
g Three studies report different associations for different proxies of LTC ex-
perience and have been counted under “none”.
7 Of course the actual insurance value is also important. Increases in daily
benefits and benefit periods, as well as decreases in the deductible period are
associated with higher LTCI uptake according to a recent stated-preferences
study (Akaichi et al., 2019).
8 Only one study (Swamy, 2004) finds that having a financial advisor does not
significantly change LTCI ownership.
9 This does not hold for Federal Partnership programs that protect a portion of
an individual’s assets that would otherwise need to be spent down in order to
become eligible for Medicaid. Most research shows that these programs do not
change coverage and are de facto a tax benefit for those who would have bought
LTCI in any case (e.g., Bergquist et al., 2018).
10 There may be a differential effect of tax deductions and tax credits. Most
studies explicitly focusing on tax deductions report a positive impact on uptake,
whereas studies focusing on tax incentives in general do not.
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studies. Moreover, the impact of social benefit extensions and tax in-
centives on LTCI demand does not seem to be equally distributed
among the targeted population. Rather, tax incentives may pre-
dominantly benefit wealthier (Lin and Prince, 2013) or healthier
(Cornell and Grabowski, 2018) individuals. Perceptions also seem to be
important as uptake is generally lower among individuals who perceive
public coverage to be more extensive (Kumar et al., 1995; McCall et al.,
1998; Unruh et al., 2016), with only two studies reporting no sig-
nificant effects (Brown et al., 2012; Swamy, 2004). Similarly, framing
of LTCI products is suggested to play a role in these decisions (Gottlieb
and Mitchell, 2015; Pincus et al., 2017).
Finally, Table 3 shows that expected availability of informal care
may negatively impact LTCI uptake, although a majority of the studies
finds no significant association. At the same time, Courbage and
Roudaut (2008) show with an objective measure of predicted avail-
ability that informal care availability can also increase uptake. This
may be because purchasing LTCI can protect family and friends from
informal caregiving.
Why is LTCI uptake so low?
From our theoretical (Section “Demand for LTCI”) and empirical
overview (Sections “Individual factors” and “Contextual factors”) we
infer four general explanations for the low uptake of private LTCI: (i)
substitution by public LTCI or informal care; (ii) adverse selection; (iii)
individual preferences that differ from those assumed in standard eco-
nomic models of consumer behavior; (iv) financial illiteracy; and (v)
discuss how these may relate to the distribution of LTCI uptake over the
population.
(i) In line with theoretical predictions, there is strong evidence that
private LTCI is to some extent substituted by public LTCI. LTCI may also
be substituted with informal care, but this relationship is less clear cut.
Our results suggests that both the number of children and the expected
availability of informal care givers may decrease LTCI uptake, whereas
marital status seems to have no impact on uptake. Potentially, these
results reflect the fact that these measures are quite generic: if you have
a partner or children this does not necessarily mean that they are able
(and willing) to provide informal care. Alternatively, Coe et al. (2015a)
have shown that LTCI ownership by parents, can induce children to live
further away from their parents and to work more. In other words,
purchasing private LTCI may could lower ex-post informal care ex-
pectations and the negative relationship may also reflect reverse caus-
ality.
(ii) As theoretically predicted, adverse selection could also play a
role on the LTCI market, as the existence of private information has
been proven both directly (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) and in-
directly (Gan et al., 2015) and as people seem fairly responsive to the
price of LTCI (Cornell and Grabowski, 2018; Costa-Font and Font, 2009;
Cramer and Jensen, 2006; Goda, 2011).
The empirical literature highlights three potential sources of private
information: objective knowledge of LTC risks, subjective knowledge of
LTC risks and subjective knowledge of health. First, some individuals
know that they are objectively likely to have high LTC costs, for ex-
ample because they suffer from a genetic diseases associated with
higher LTC needs. These individuals are more likely to purchase LTCI
(Oster et al., 2010). Second, individuals who expect to have LTC needs
in the future take out more private LTCI. If this subjective risk assess-
ment is accurate this would lead to adverse selection, but it is unclear
whether this is actually the case.11 Third, one would expect adverse
selection to concentrate uptake among subjectively less healthy in-
dividuals, yet our review finds the opposite. Hence, some authors
conclude that people do not realize that poor health can lead to LTC
needs later in life (Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014). Another potential
explanation is that subjectively healthier people may expect to live
longer and associate longevity with LTC needs (Cramer and Jensen,
2006), but it is unclear whether this is indeed the case.
In addition, some studies have analyzed whether dynamic adverse
selection (i.e., individuals adversely select when receiving new in-
formation on their risk status) drives lapsing. These studies find higher
LTC utilization among non-lapsers (Finkelstein et al., 2005; Konetzka
and Luo, 2011). However, this could also be due to ex-post moral ha-
zard. Moreover, Konetzka and Luo (2011) argue that such lapsing re-
flects personal finances and the availability of informal caregivers ra-
ther than private information.
Although adverse selection is taking place at the individual level,
Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that the LTCI risk pool does not
have a larger LTC risk than the population at large. This is unlikely to be
a result of successful underwriting, since our review shows that ADL
impairments – which are the main objective health factors used in
underwriting – are not significantly associated with LTCI uptake. In-
stead, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that adverse selection is
compensated by the advantageous selection of low risk individuals with
strong insurance preferences.
(iii) Low uptake could also be driven by preferences that deviate
from those typically assumed in economic models. For example, our
results highlight that risk aversion does not unambiguously increase
insurance, which contrasts with standard economic theory. Possibly,
people perceive LTCI as a risky investment rather than as a risk-redu-
cing insurance product. In other words, if LTC is not needed then pre-
miums do not ‘pay off’ (Kunreuther et al., 2012). Additionally, our re-
view shows that preferences for formal care impact LTCI uptake.12
Specifically, preferences for informal care over formal care may de-
crease LTCI uptake.
Moreover, people may fear that insurers will not pay out, as distrust
of insurance companies is associated with lower LTCI uptake. Such a
trust relationship may be especially important as LTCI provides cov-
erage against risks that are often in the far future. The fact that LTCI
may only pay out in the future, may also trigger nonstandard time
preferences or state-dependent utility preferences. Nonetheless, we
found no empirical evidence about the impact of time preferences on
insurance uptake.
Finally, most evidence for the theoretically suggested impact of
state-dependent utility remains indirect. For example, using the HRS
Finkelstein et al. (2013) show that marginal utility decreases when
health decreases, but they do not directly link this to LTCI uptake. One
study suggests that people who prefer to spend resources on care when
ill over spending them on other goods and services when healthy are
indeed more likely to purchase LTCI (Brown et al., 2012). Still, this
result should be interpreted with caution as by explicitly referring to
Table 3
Overview of findings by studies on contextual factors associated with LTCI
uptake (number of quasi-experimental studies between brackets).
Factor Association Total
Negative None Positive
# (#) % # (#) % # (#) % #
Social benefits 4 (1) 40% 6 (0) 60% 0 (0) 0% 10 (1)
Tax subsidiesa 0 (0) 0% 4 (0) 44% 5 (3) 56% 9 (3)
Informal care availability 4 (0) 31% 7 (0) 54% 2 (0) 15% 13 (0)
a One study reports different associations of tax deductions and tax credits and
has been counted under “none”.
11 Friedberg et al. (2017) find LTC expectations not to be a significant pre-
dictor of actual LTC use later in life, whereas Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
find the opposite.
12 Bequest motives have also been left out of some standard economic pre-
dictions, even though they work to increase uptake, as is described theoretically
and found empirically. As such, bequest motives only increase the discrepancy
between prediction and actual uptake.
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spending resources on LTC, this study may to some extent have mea-
sured preferences for LTCI itself rather than state dependent pre-
ferences.
(iv) People may find it difficult to make decisions on purchasing
LTCI, which may cause them to deviate from expected utility max-
imization. This may be loss so for more financially literate individuals,
who are consequently more likely to take out private LTCI.
Additionally, in line with theoretical predictions of probability under-
weighting, our review shows that those who are aware of LTC risks
purchase more insurance than those who do not. Finally, Lin and Prince
(2016) show that wealthier individuals are also better able to make use
of sponsored LTCI plans, indicating that socio-economic status may to
some extent reflect such decision-making ability.
(v) From our review it follows that uptake of LTCI differs across
different subgroups of the population, and that it is likely to be con-
centrated among individuals with higher education, income and
wealth. This may well be seen as a byproduct of the causes for low
uptake. First, as most social benefit schemes are means-tested, crowding
out should theoretically take place predominantly among individuals
with low income and wealth (Brown and Finkelstein, 2008). This is also
what is observed empirically (Brown et al., 2007b) and works to in-
crease relative uptake among wealthier individuals. Second, if people
use subjective health as a proxy for LTC and longevity risks, adverse
selection can work to concentrate uptake among individuals with high
socio-economic status individuals as these are relatively healthy. Third,
it has been shown that preferences for insurance differ and are an im-
portant determinant of LTCI uptake (Browne and Zhou-Richter, 2014;
Cutler et al., 2008; Gan et al., 2015). These preferences are at least
partially related to wealth, as research shows that wealthier in-
dividuals13 (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) are more likely to own
LTCI, yet much less likely to enter a nursing home. Fourth, financial
literacy could be correlated with socio-economic status and could thus
lead to increased uptake among those with a higher socio-economic
status.
Uptake of annuities
Table 4 provides an overview of all 44 included empirical studies on
annuity uptake decisions. Clearly, these studies are more diverse than
those analyzing LTCI decisions. Datasets consist of experimental data,
survey data (often from independently developed surveys) and ad-
ministrative datasets. This variety in empirical methods is also reflected
in the GRADE quality of the studies: 6 studies are graded ‘B’, 27 ‘C’ and
11 ‘D’. Moreover, sample restrictions concerning age are generally
much more inclusive than for LTCI, as they may compromise all adult
age groups.
Annuitization itself is measured in two ways. Many studies measure
revealed preferences. Such studies either follow cohorts of individuals
that retire and measure their annuitization decisions (e.g., Brown and
Previtero, 2014; Bütler and Teppa, 2007; Hurd and Panis, 2006) or use
a survey to ask whether individuals own annuities (e.g., Pfarr and
Schneider, 2013; Schreiber and Weber, 2016). Another strand of re-
search uses hypothetical annuitization measures to elicit stated pre-
ferences (e.g., Knoller, 2016; Wu et al., 2017). Occasionally, associa-
tions found by stated and revealed preferences point to different
directions. When suited, we reflect on this.
Individual factors
Table 5 displays the main findings of the empirical studies on in-
dividual factors associated with annuity uptake. Below we reflect on
these factors one-by-one. Table D10 shows exactly which associations
were found by which studies and distinguishes between the results of
revealed and stated preferences.
As to gender and age, uptake patterns displayed in Table 5 are
broadly similar to those of LTCI, including the differences between
stated and revealed preference studies. Women may be more likely to
opt for annuities than men, although the majority of included studies
finds no significant difference. Again this may highlight the fact that
without gender-based pricing annuities are effectively cheaper for
women, who on average live longer. Gender-based risk differences are
currently not allowed to be translated into premiums in the EU
(European Union, 2004) and in employer-sponsored plans in the US
(Arizona Governing Committee for Tax Deferred Annuity and Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 1983). The impact of age on uptake re-
mains difficult to interpret. To some extent, age effects may reflect
cohort effects of studies employing age-cohorts, although there are
admittedly fewer doing so for annuities than for LTCI. Even so, there is
no clear pattern in the effects summarized in Table 5, and the
two studies analyzing squared age effects retrieve different results:
one reports a positive effect of age squared (Clark et al., 2014), whereas
the other finds no significant effect (Teppa, 2011). Finally, ethnicity
may impact uptake. Yet, we find only one study (Hurd and Panis,
2006) that reports a positive association between being black and
annuitization.
Table 5 also shows that wealth is generally positively associated
with annuity uptake, even though a large share of the stated preference
studies find no significant association. At the same time, income and
annuity uptake may be positively associated, but the majority of the
studies reports no significant association. This effect is driven by stated
preference studies, suggesting that although stated preferences may be
similar, actual uptake may differ along income and wealth. Education
and homeownership14 are found to be of limited relevance in ex-
plaining annuitization. The low number of studies finding any effect of
education is markedly different from the strong association found with
LTCI uptake and consistent between stated preferences and revealed
preference studies.
As to the impact of family characteristics, Table 5 shows that most
studies do not find any effect of either having children15, being mar-
ried16 or having bequest motives. This is clearly different from theo-
retical predictions that families could offer efficient risk pools. Still, our
results do not rule out that some individuals pursue theoretically pre-
dicted strategic bequest motives. If some individuals have strategic
negative bequest motives (increasing uptake) this could on average
offset other people’s positive bequest motives (decreasing uptake) such
that the aggregate effect of bequest motives is indistinguishable from
zero.
In addition, Table 5 highlights the potential importance of sub-
jective and objective risk factors in annuity decisions. One third of the
included studies find that individuals with better subjective health and
subjective longevity are more likely to purchase annuities, but the
majority of studies does not find evidence of a significant relationship.
Particularly, none of the revealed preference studies included reports a
significant association. Few studies analyze the relationship between
objective longevity risks and annuity uptake. One study notes that the
number of chronic illnesses has no impact on annuity uptake (Chou
et al., 2016). Studies analyzing realized longevity for historic annuity
uptake all find that those who purchased annuities lived longer. Ad-
ditionally, there is some evidence that the longevity of parents is also
13 As well as individuals who use preventive health services and individuals
who always wear their seatbelts (Cutler et al., 2008; Finkelstein and McGarry,
2006).
14 One study looking into the impact of home equity rather than home
ownership finds that increases in home equity may decrease annuity uptake
among the lowest home equity quintiles (Guillemette et al., 2016).
15 One study shows a positive impact of having dependent children on an-
nuity uptake (Bütler and Teppa, 2007).
16 There are no systematic differences when married individuals are com-
pared to single, divorced or widowed individuals.
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positively associated with annuity uptake.17 All in all, the evidence
available suggests that experienced health and objective longevity are
positively associated with annuity uptake.
Furthermore, there is no convincing evidence that risk preferences
are associated with uptake decisions. First, the evidence we map in
Table 5 does not show clear association of risk aversion or stock market
participation with annuity holding. Second, another indicator of risky
behavior, namely smoking, does not seem to be associated with annuity
uptake (Guillemette et al., 2016; Hurwitz and Sade, 2017). Third, even
though some studies find a positive relationship between annuity up-
take and health insurance ownership (Hurd and Panis, 2006) or LTCI
ownership (Pfarr and Schneider, 2013), others do not (Chou et al.,
2016). Additionally, several studies found patience and personal trust
in the insurance company18 positively associated with annuity uptake.
Next, Table 5 shows that financial literacy – again measured as
knowledge of probabilities, inflation, compound interest and risk
diversification – may increase annuity uptake.1920 In addition, two
other studies find a positive association between a principal component
of education, financial literacy and cognitive intactness on the one hand
and annuity valuation on the other (Brown et al., 2017a,b). Using a
financial advisor is also associated with higher uptake (Pfarr and
Schneider, 2013). Even so, studies using subjective measures of fi-
nancial literacy find that these are associated with lower uptake of
annuity products (Bateman et al., 2017; Bockweg et al., 2016) or have
no effect (Knoller, 2016; Shu et al., 2018; Van der Cruijsen and Jonker,
2016). Potentially because these measures indicate financial (over)
confidence, rather than actual financial literacy (Bateman et al., 2017).
Finally, Table 5 displays risk awareness as a relevant factor in an-
nuity uptake. Two studies highlight that such awareness associated
positively with annuity uptake. In addition, two quasi-experimental
studies show that salience of longevity risks – achieved by asking re-
spondents about their subjective longevity (Payne et al., 2013) or by
showing a mortality graph (Beshears et al., 2014) before making an
annuity uptake decision – increases uptake as well.
Contextual factors
Contextual factors that are associated with annuity uptake are sum-
marized in Table 6 (see Table D11 for a more in-depth overview). Contrary
to theoretical predictions, not all evidence shows that social benefits may
decrease annuity uptake. That such substitution is not observed here, may
be due to the fact that in many countries social benefits are additional to
other pension rights, thus offering basic financial security for the majority of
the population (Schreiber and Weber, 2016). Public policy seems to mainly
impact uptake through setting annuitization rules. First, Cannon et al.
(2016) show that flexibilization of mandatory annuitization led to lower
annuity uptake in the UK. Clearly, annuitizing by default increases uptake,
potentially because it decreases procrastination andmakes annuitizing more
simple.21 Second, tax incentives can also increase annuity uptake as shown
in Table 6.22
Annuity equivalent wealth is also positively associated with uptake,
as shown in Table 6.23 Similarly some studies have argued that uptake
is low because policies have too little value compared to their costs
(Brown, 2001; Doyle et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 1999). One study
analyzing the perceived fairness of a policy reports similar results for
subjective policy value (Shu et al., 2018). The relative value of an-
nuities can also impact uptake. Table 6 shows that a higher return on
investment for other investment products can decrease the uptake of
annuities. Although other investments can indeed serve as investment
substitutes, overreliance on recent stock market developments in de-
termining investment portfolios induces individuals to underinvest in
annuities and leads to welfare losses (Previtero, 2014).
In addition, Table 6 shows that framing can be of great importance in
uptake decisions. Multiple studies show that framing annuities as in-
vestment, rather than as insurance of consumption, decreases uptake.
This is likely because investment framing emphasizes the possibility that
people pay more annuity premiums than they will receive in terms of
benefits, thus triggering loss aversion (Brown et al., 2008). Consequently,
evidence including one quasi-experimental study suggests that annuities
Table 5
Overview of findings by studies on individual factors associated with annuity
uptake.
Factor Association Total
Negative None Positive
# % # % # % #
Demographics
Femalea 4 17% 12 52% 7 30% 23
Age 8 36% 7 32% 7 32% 22
Non-white 0 0% 1 50% 1 50% 2
Socio-economic status
Education 0 0% 14 82% 3 18% 17
Incomea 1 7% 9 64% 4 29% 14
Home ownership 0 0% 4 100% 0 0% 4
Wealtha 1 7% 5 33% 9 60% 15
Family
Number of childrenb 1 8% 12 92% 0 0% 13
Marriedc 2 12% 15 88% 0 0% 17
Bequest motive 1 14% 5 71% 1 14% 7
Subjective risk
Subjective health 0 0% 6 67% 3 33% 9
Subjective longevitya 1 8% 7 58% 4 33% 12
Objective risk
Longevityd 0 0% 2 50% 2 50% 4
Preferences
Risk aversion 3 27% 5 45% 3 27% 11
Stock market participation 1 17% 3 50% 2 33% 6
Patience 0 0% 0 0% 4 100% 4
Trust insurer 0 0% 1 50% 1 50% 2
Understanding
Financial literacye 2 20% 4 40% 4 40% 10
Salience
Awareness of longevity risk 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 2
a Discrepancy in results of stated and revealed preferences studies.
b Three studies report having children (or not) rather than the number of
children.
c Three studies report different associations for married individuals compared
to individuals who are single, divorced, or widowed and have been counted
under “none”.
d One study reports different associations for two measures of ex-ante mortality
and has been counted under “none”.
e One study reports different associations for three different measures of fi-
nancial literacy and has been counted under “none”.
17 Two studies looking at job mortality find a positive association (Cutler
et al., 2008) and no association (Hurwitz and Sade, 2017) with annuity uptake.
18 One study analyzing the impact of objective financial strength of a com-
pany finds no association (Chou et al., 2016).
19 Moreover, one of the studies that note a negative impact of financial lit-
eracy on uptake finds a positive impact of specific product knowledge (Chou
et al., 2016).
20 A hypothetical study that corrects for survey attention also finds that
survey attention increases hypothetical annuity uptake (Bateman et al., 2017).
21 Procrastination is associated with lower uptake (Brown and Previtero,
2014), whereas two studies find that simplicity of the product is associated with
higher uptake (Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, Mitchell, et al., 2017) or not asso-
ciated with uptake (Bockweg et al., 2016).
22 Design of incentives is important, as poorly designed incentives can de-
crease the relative attractiveness of annuities (Charupat and Milevsky, 2001).
23 One study suggests that this relationship is non-linear, as it finds a statis-
tically significant positive squared effect (Clark et al., 2014)
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with additional protections – such as period guarantees, principal pro-
tections, or inflation coverage – can increase uptake. In line with this,
one quasi-experimental study shows that framing annuities in terms of
lack of flexibility and control significantly reduces uptake (Beshears
et al., 2014). Other framing aspects may also be of importance, as an-
other quasi-experimental study shows that using a “live to” (rather than
“die by”) frame (Payne et al., 2013) increases uptake. Framing a specific
annuity goal may (Knoller, 2016) or may not (Brown et al., 2013) in-
crease uptake. Finally, one study shows that people annuitize less when
risks are more ambiguous and when the choice tasks is more complex
(i.e., more information is offered) (Brown et al., 2017b).
Why is annuity uptake so low?
From our theoretical (Section “Demand for annuities”) and em-
pirical overview (Sections “Individual factors” and “Contextual fac-
tors”) we infer the same explanations for low uptake of annuities as
those inferred earlier for LTCI: (i) substitution by social benefits; (ii)
adverse selection; (iii) individual preferences that differ from those
assumed in standard economic models of consumer behavior; and (iv)
financial illiteracy. Subsequently, (v) we discuss how these may relate
to the distribution of annuity uptake over the population.
(i) As theoretically predicted, substitution by social benefits can
decrease annuity uptake. Whether it actually does, however, seems to
depend crucially on the design of the social benefit system. If social
benefits are used only as a safety net for those worst off, then it may
substitute for annuity uptake. If social benefits provide a base con-
sumption for all retirees, substitution does not seem to take place.
In addition, other investments have theoretically been proposed to
substitute for annuity uptake (Hainaut and Devolder, 2006). In practice,
we find evidence that people purchase annuities less when stock indices
are high. However, this does not seem to indicate that stock market
investments actually substitute for annuities. Rather, overreliance on
recent stock price increases induces people to overestimate returns on
annuities and to underannuitize for retirement altogether (Previtero,
2014). Hence, although stock prices are associated with lower uptake, it
is not clear to what extent this is driven by substitution and to what
extent by limited rationality.
(ii) Adverse selection seems to play a role in the annuity market, as
predicted theoretically. Our results highlight that those who take up
annuities have a higher longevity risk; they may be subjectively heal-
thier, may have a higher subjective longevity risk and they live objec-
tively longer. Additionally, studies analyzing annuity equivalent worth
– or policy value – have shown that this is lower due to adverse se-
lection (Brown, 2001; Doyle et al., 2004; Mitchell et al., 1999).
(iii) Nonstandard preferences may also explain lower than expected
annuity demand. In line with theoretical predictions, our overview of
empirical studies suggests that higher levels of patience are associated
with higher levels of annuity. However, our overview also highlights
discrepancies between theoretical and empirical studies. First, there is
no evidence that risk aversion or any proxy thereof is associated with
higher annuity uptake. Second, bequest motives do not seem to increase
annuity uptake, although this may indicate that some parents use be-
quests to strategically influence behavior of their children.
(iv) As for LTCI, it seems that annuity uptake decisions are difficult.
Specifically, higher financial literacy and greater salience of longevity risks
lead to increased annuity uptake, suggesting that those with greater
knowledge or risk awareness are better protected against longevity risks.
Additionally, one study has highlighted that people who are prone to pro-
crastinate are less likely to own annuities (Brown and Previtero, 2014).
Moreover, uptake decisions seem to be guided by contextual defaults and
framing, rather than by expected utility maximization. Finally, trust in in-
surance companies is associated with higher annuity uptake and lack
thereof may thus contribute to low uptake levels.
(v) From our review it follows that uptake of annuities differs across
different subgroups of the population, as does the uptake of LTCI. Even
though substitution by social benefits (among lower income in-
dividuals) plays a role in annuity uptake, we find that uptake is con-
centrated among individuals with high wealth (and likely also high
income). Following our other explanations for low uptake we infer that
these individuals may (a) have better subjective health and higher
longevity and adversely select into the annuity market; (b) simply have
other preferences than those with lower wealth, although this is not
supported by stated preference studies; and/or (c) be better able to
judge the value of those products.
Discussion
Our study provides an overview of the evidence from revealed
preference studies, stated preference studies and theoretical models of
demand for LTCI and annuities, integrating the limited quasi-experi-
mental research available. Altogether, the evidence consistently sug-
gests that low uptake follows from substitution, adverse selection,
nonstandard preferences and limited rationality. Hence, our findings
are unlikely to reflect measurement errors that are specific to these
research methods. Rather, we show that employing different methods
to answer the pressing LTCI and annuity puzzles renders qualitatively
similar results on aggregate.
In addition, combining our results may provide valuable insight into
the factors that impact insurance decisions for late-in-life risks in gen-
eral. Particularly, this may elucidate to what extent groups with low
LTCI and annuity uptake may overlap. Therefore, Table 7 summarizes
which specific aspects limit uptake for both LTCI and annuities. Uptake
of both LTCI and annuities is lower for individuals that (i) are eligible
for public policies that can substitute for private insurance; (ii) that are
subjectively less healthy; (iii) that have lower trust in insurance com-
panies; and (iv) that are less financially literate or risk aware.
These results may contain lessons for integrated products that insure
simultaneously against LTC and longevity risks. Such life-care annuities
(LCAs) have been proposed on a theoretical basis to diminish adverse
selection by combining negatively correlated LTC and longevity risks in
one product (Murtaugh et al., 2001).24 Although in the US uptake of
annuities with LTC riders seems promising, it is unclear whether these
products indeed broaden the market. Currently, only one study has
analyzed demand for LCAs directly (Wu et al., 2018). This study finds
no evidence of selection effects in purchase decisions for hypothetic
integrated products, but also highlights that uptake is impacted by risk
awareness as well as by ease of financial knowledge acquisition.
Table 6
Overview of findings by studies on contextual factors associated with annuity
uptake (number of quasi-experimental studies between brackets).
Factor Association Total
Negative None Positive
# (#) % # (#) % # (#) % #
Social benefitsa 1 (0) 33% 2 (0) 67% 0 (0) 0% 3 (0)
Tax incentives 0 (0) 0% 0 (0) 0% 3 (0) 100% 3 (0)
Annuity equivalent worth 1 (0) 17% 0 (0) 0% 5 (1) 83% 6 (1)
Return on investments 3 (0) 75% 1 (0) 25% 0 (0) 0% 4 (0)
Annuity as defaults 0 (0) 0% 1 (0) 75% 4 (0) 80% 5 (0)
Framing as investment 4 (1) 80% 1 (1) 20% 0 (0) 0% 5 (2)
Protectionsb 0 (0) 0% 1 (0) 20% 4 (1) 80% 5 (1)
a One study reports different associations of different social benefit schemes and
has been counted under “none”.
b One study reports a positive association with period guarantees and a negative
association with inflation protection and has been counted under “none”.
24 This has been disputed by Zhou-Richter and Gründl (2011) who argue that
long-term care and longevity risks are positively correlated and that LCAs hence
may offer even more room for adverse selection.
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In particular, we speculate that integrated products are unlikely to
substantially expand the market as a whole for three reasons. First, uptake is
not only limited by adverse selection, but also impacted by substitution,
nonstandard preferences and limited rationality. Second, all these ex-
planations seem to result in a concentration of demand among healthy in-
dividuals with higher wealth, making it difficult to expand the market for
LTCI and longevity insurance products to a broader population. Third, an
integrated product may turn out to be more complex than two separate
products and may thus work to decrease uptake amongst the least financial
literate. Nonetheless, future work remains necessary to better understand
the viability of such integrated products.
Conclusion and recommendations
Our systematic literature review shows that similar factors hinder
the uptake of both LTCI and annuities. Specifically, we find that uptake
is lowered by substitution by social security, adverse selection, non-
standard preferences and limited rationality due to low financial lit-
eracy and risk unawareness. Moreover, these factors may also explain
why insurance holding is concentrated among individuals with high
wealth and good subjective health. An integrated product – only fo-
cusing on solving adverse selection issues – is unlikely to solve other
aspects that limit uptake. Particularly, our results show that uptake for
integrated products is likely to remain concentrated among wealthier
and subjectively healthier individuals.
Further research is warranted to better understand the dynamics of
LTCI and annuity uptake. Specifically, it is worth analyzing to what
extent our findings can indeed explain the concentration of uptake
among individuals with good subjective health and high wealth. The
fact that uptake of private insurance is unequally distributed also has
important consequences for policy makers. In so far as low uptake re-
flects an active choice to substitute for private insurance or reflects a
dislike of private insurance, it echoes individual preferences and re-
quires no action. However, to the extent that it reflects adverse selec-
tion or limited rationality, lower uptake is a product of underlying in-
equalities in health or longevity and related unequal capabilities, and
that may warrant policy interventions.
If the goal is to increase insurance uptake on private LTCI or annuity
markets, policy makers and insurers could undertake several actions to
create a more inclusive insurance market. First, individuals with low fi-
nancial literacy should be empowered to make their own insurance deci-
sions. This may not only be achieved through educational policies that in-
crease financial literacy and hence understanding of LTCI and annuity
products. In addition, complexity of the choice environment should be re-
duced by making insurance policies easier to comprehend and by reducing
the number of policy options. Second, risk awareness increases insurance
uptake; policy makers and insurers could thus focus on raising awareness of
LTC and longevity risks. Particularly, governments should be clear about
what social benefits do and do not reimburse and about what contribution
is expected from citizens themselves. Even though large-scale awareness
campaign sometimes have limited impact (Iwasaki et al., 2010), such
campaigns are easy and relatively cheap to implement. Third, since our
results show that distrust of insurers additionally drives low uptake, gov-
ernment regulation or insurance standards that protect insured persons by
guaranteeing the pay out of fair claims may help to increase uptake. Fourth,
evidence on the importance of perceptions, framing and defaults suggests
that these may provide effective nudges for increasing insurance uptake (for
an illustration, see: Bonsang and Costa-Font, 2019). In addition, offering
products with guaranteed pay-outs when the insured risk does not (fully)
materialize may prove particularly effective.
Finally, the fact that those with lower subjective health, risk
awareness or financial literacy buy predictably less protection against
late-in-life risks may provide an argument for stronger government
intervention. Particularly, governments may aim not only to safeguard
individual freedom of choice, but also to protect their citizens from
major financial risks. Hence, compulsory coverage – through an in-
dividual mandate for those not-covered by social insurance schemes or
through an extension of social insurance schemes – may be warranted.
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Table 7
Explanations for low uptake of LTCI and annuities and their similarities.
LTCI Annuity Similarities
Substitution • Is substituted by social benefits that provide a
safety net only
• Is substituted by social benefits that provide a
safety net only
• Social benefits that provide a safety net only may
substitute for private insurance
• May be substituted by informal care availability • Is not substituted by intra-family risk pooling
Adverse selection • Individuals with subjectively better health have
higher uptake
• Individuals with subjectively better health
have higher uptake
• Individuals with subjectively better health have
higher uptake
• Individuals with higher subjective LTC risks
have higher uptake
• Individuals with higher subjective longevity
risks have higher uptake
• Individuals with objectively worse health do not
have higher uptake
• Individuals with objectively higher longevity
risks have higher uptake
Nonstandard preferences • Trust in insurers is associated with higher uptake • Trust in insurers is associated with higher
uptake
• Trust in insurers is associated with higher uptake
• Risk aversion is not associated with uptake • Risk aversion is not associated with uptake • Risk aversion is not associated with uptake
Limited rationality • Financial literacy is associated with higher
uptake
• Financial literacy is associated with higher
uptake
• Financial literacy is associated with higher uptake
• Risk awareness is associated with higher uptake • Risk awareness is associated with higher
uptake
• Risk awareness is associated with higher uptake
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Appendix A. Search string Embase.com
(((longevity/de OR 'long term care'/de OR 'elderly care'/exp OR retirement/de OR pensioner/de OR 'nursing home'/de) AND ('insurance'/de OR
'social insurance'/de OR 'social security'/de)) OR (((longevit* OR long-term-care OR longterm-care OR life OR ltc OR pension* OR retirement* OR
nursing-home*) NEAR/6 (insur* OR annuit* OR Social-securit*)) OR ltci):ab,ti) AND ('decision making'/de OR 'purchasing'/de OR 'attitude'/de OR
'attitude to aging'/de OR 'attitude to disability'/de OR 'attitude to death'/de OR 'attitude to life'/de OR 'attitude to illness'/de OR 'attitude to health'/
de OR 'consumer attitude'/de OR 'family attitude'/exp OR motivation/de OR 'decision support system'/de OR consumer/de OR (((decision* OR
decid* OR uptake OR nonuptake OR purchase* OR nonpurchase* OR why OR buy OR buying OR reason* OR motivation* OR take-up OR choos* OR
choice* OR procure OR willing* OR persua* OR selling OR crowd*-out* OR puzzle* OR obtain* OR select OR selecting OR selection OR take OR
taking OR get OR getting OR interes* OR acquire* OR acquisition* OR afford* OR abilit* OR able OR pay OR paying OR preference* OR substit* OR
exchang* OR replac* OR self-control* OR discount* OR invest* OR reference* OR consum* OR Participat* OR attain* OR wtp OR value* OR worth
OR utilit* OR attitude* OR belief* OR confidence* OR overconfiden* OR confident OR trust* OR expectation* OR estimate* OR probabilit* OR
weighting OR weighing OR bias* OR predispos* OR prejudice* OR approximat* OR guess OR assess* OR evaluat* OR uncertain* OR ambigu* OR
attention* OR focus* OR sensitivit* OR concern OR concerns OR behav* OR perception* OR perceive* OR factor* OR salien* OR capacit* OR access*
OR framing OR emotion* OR default OR familiar* OR pressure OR market* OR incentiv* OR disincentiv* OR barrier* OR facilitator*) NEAR/6
(insur* OR long-term-care-insurance* OR annuit*))):ab,ti) NOT ([Conference Abstract]/lim OR [Letter]/lim OR [Note]/lim OR [Editorial]/lim) AND
[english]/lim
Appendix B. PRISMA flow diagram
Figure B1
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Appendix C. Individual and contextual level empirical evidence on LTCI uptake
Table C8
Overview of findings by studies on individual factors associated with annuity uptake.
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Female 4 20 13
Stated preferences 3
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Swamy (2004)
• Stevenson et al. (2009)
7
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Brau et al. (2010)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
• He and Chou (2018)
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 1
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
13
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Gousia (2016)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• Mellor (2000)
• Mellor (2001)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Stum (2008)
13
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Bernet (2004)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Pinquet et al. (2011)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
Age 8 18 11
Stated preferences 3
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
• Brau et al. (2010)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)
2
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Wu et al. (2017)
2
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
• Pincus et al. (2017)
Revealed preferences 5
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• He and Chou (2018)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
• Swamy (2004)
16
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Mellor (2001)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)a
• Stevenson et al. (2009)
• Stum (2008)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)b
• Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
9
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Bernet (2004)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Doerpinghaus and Gustavson (2002)
• Gousia (2016)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Mellor (2000)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
Non-white 1 13 2
Stated preferences 1
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
1
• Allaire et al. (2016)
0
Revealed preferences 0 12
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)c
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)c
• Li and Jensen (2012)c
• McGarry et al. (2014)c
• McGarry et al. (2016)c
• McGarry et al. (2018)c
• McNamara and Lee (2004)c
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Stevenson et al. (2009)c
• Swamy (2004)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)c
2
• Bernet (2004)
• Caro et al. (2011)
(continued on next page)
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Table C8 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Education 2 10 18
Stated preferences 0 4
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Brau et al. (2010)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
2
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
• He and Chou (2018)
Revealed preferences 2
• Gousia (2016)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
6
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Swamy (2004)
16
• Bernet (2004)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Mellor (2000)
• Mellor (2001)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
Income 0 14 22
Stated preferences 2
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)
5
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
• Brau et al. (2010)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 12
• Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Doerpinghaus and Gustavson (2002)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Stevenson et al. (2009)
• Stum (2008)
• Swamy (2004)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
17
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Bernet (2004)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Mellor (2000)
• Mellor (2001)
• Nixon (2014)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
• Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
Home equity 2 2 0
Stated preferences 1
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
1
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 1
• Boyer et al. (2017)
1
• Stevenson et al. (2009)
0
Wealth 1 10 16
Stated preferences 0 2
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
2
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• He and Chou (2018)
Revealed preferences 1
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
8
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
• Lin and Prince (2013)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• Mellor (2000)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)a
• Stum (2008)
14
• Bernet (2004)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Gousia (2016)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
(continued on next page)
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Table C8 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Mellor (2001)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
Number of children 7 13 1
Stated preferences 1
• Brau and Bruni (2008)d
3
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)d
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)d
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 6
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Gousia (2016)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)d
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)d
10
• Barnett and Stum (2013)e
• Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)e
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• Mellor (2000)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
• Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
1
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
Married 3 25 4
Stated preferences 1
• Brau and Bruni (2008)d
5
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)d
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)d
• He and Chou (2018)
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 2
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)d
20
• Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)e
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Gousia (2016)e
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• Li and Jensen (2012)f
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Mellor (2000)
• Mellor (2001)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Stum (2008)
• Swamy (2004)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
4
• Bernet (2004)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Kumar et al. (1995)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
Bequest motive 0 4 3
Stated preferences 0 1
• He and Chou (2018)
0
Revealed preferences 0 3
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Stum (2008)
3
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Brown et al. (2012)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
Subjective health 2 19 10
Stated preferences 0 4
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Brau et al. (2010)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)
2
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
(continued on next page)
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Table C8 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Revealed preferences 2
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• Stum (2008)
15
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Gousia (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Mellor (2000)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)a
8
• Bernet (2004)
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2014)
• McNamara and Lee (2004)
• Mellor (2001)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
• Van Houtven et al. (2015)
Subjective LTC risk 0 5 14
Stated preferences 0 3
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)g
• Wu et al. (2017)h
1
• He and Chou (2018)
Revealed preferences 0 2
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Kumar et al. (1995)h
13
• Brown et al. (2012)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
• Finkelstein and McGarry (2006)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Kitajima (1999)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
• Swamy (2004)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
Subjective longevity 0 6 0
Stated preferences 0 3
• Costa-Font and Font (2009)h
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 0 3
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
0
ADL impairments 1 14 3
Stated preferences 0 1
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
1
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 1
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
13
• Bernet (2004)
• Caro et al. (2011)
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Courtemanche and He (2009)
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Mellor (2000)
• Mellor (2001)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
2
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Nixon (2014)
(continued on next page)
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Table C8 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Risk aversion 2 3 2
Stated preferences 0 1
• Costa-Font and Rovira-Forns (2008)
0
Revealed preferences 2
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Gousia (2016)
2
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
2
• Chatterjee and Fan (2017)
• Stum (2008)
Preference for formal care 0 0 3
Stated preferences 0 0 1
• He and Chou (2018)
Revealed preferences 0 0 2
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Brown et al. (2012)
Trust insurer 0 0 2
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 0 2
• Brown et al. (2012)
• Curry et al. (2009)
Financial literacy 1 0 4
Stated preferences 0 0 1
• He and Chou (2018)
Revealed preferences 1
• Boyer et al. (2017)
0 3
• Gousia (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
System knowledge 0 4 1
Stated preferences 0 0 1
• Kitajima (1999)
Revealed preferences 0 4
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Swamy (2004)
• Unruh et al. (2016)
0
Cognitive intactness 0 3 1
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 3
• Gottlieb and Mitchell (2015)
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)
1
• Friedberg et al. (2017)
Awareness 0 3 5
Stated preferences 0 1
• Allaire et al. (2016)
0
Revealed preferences 0 2
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Browne and Zhou-Richter (2014)
5
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Stum (2008)
• Swamy (2004)
• Zhou-Richter et al. (2010)
LTC experience 2 9 8
Stated preferences 1
• Kitajima (1999)
2
• Allaire et al. (2016)
• Wu et al. (2017)
3
• Brau and Bruni (2008)
• Kennedy et al. (2016)
• Tennyson and Yang (2014)
(continued on next page)
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Appendix D. Individual and contextual level empirical evidence on annuity uptake
Table C8 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Revealed preferences 1
• Kumar et al. (1995)
7
• Barnett and Stum (2013)
• Coe et al. (2015b)i
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Li and Jensen (2012)i
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Swamy (2004)
• Unruh et al. (2016)i
5
• Courbage and Roudaut (2008)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• Stum (2008)
a Reports different associations in equivalent analyses and is therefore counted under “none”.
b Reports two different age associations and is therefore counted under “none”.
c Reports different associations for “black”, “Hispanic” and/or “other” and is therefore counted under “none”.
d Reports household size and is therefore counted under both children and married.
e Reports having children (or not) rather than number of children.
f Reports different associations for married individuals compared to individuals that are single, divorced or widowed and is therefore counted under “none”.
g Reports an interaction of LTC risk and longevity risk.
h Reports different associations for home care and nursing home expectations and is therefore counted under “none”.
i Reports different associations for different proxies of LTC experience and is therefore counted under “none”.
Table C9
Overview of findings by studies on individual factors associated with LTCI uptake.
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Social benefits 4 6 0
Stated preferences 0 1
• He and Chou (2018)
0
Revealed preferences 4
• Brown et al. (2007b)†
• Doerpinghaus and Gustavson (2002)
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
• Konetzka and Luo (2011)
5
• Kumar et al. (1995)a
• Li and Jensen (2012)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Sloan and Norton (1997)b
• Stevenson et al. (2009)a
0
Tax incentive 0 4 5
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 4
• McGarry et al. (2018)
• Nixon (2014)
• Stevenson et al. (2009)c
• Stum (2008)
5
• Cornell and Grabowski (2018)†
• Cramer and Jensen (2006)
• Courtemanche and He (2009)†
• Goda (2011)†
• Jiménez-Martín et al. (2016)
Informal care availability 4 7 2
Stated preferences 0 3
• Ameriks et al. (2018)
• He and Chou (2018)
• Wu et al. (2017)
0
Revealed preferences 4
• Bernet (2004)
• Brown et al. (2012)
• McCall et al. (1998)
• McGarry et al. (2018)
4
• McGarry et al. (2016)
• Mellor (2001)
• Schaber and Stum (2007)
• Stum (2008)
2
• Boyer et al. (2017)
• Coe et al. (2015a,b)
† Quasi-experimental study (highest level of evidence available).
a Reports different associations of various measures of social benefit generosity and is therefore counted under “none”.
b Reports different associations in equivalent analyses and is therefore counted under “none”.
c Reports different associations of tax deductions and tax credits and is therefore counted under “none”.
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Table D10
Overview of findings per study on individual factors associated with annuity uptake.
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Female 4 12 7
Stated preferences 2
• Nosi et al. (2017)
• Teppa (2011)
7
• Bateman et al. (2017)
• Beshears, Choi et al. (2014)
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou, Inkmann et al. (2016)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Shu et al. (2018)
1
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 2
• Bütler and Teppa (2007)
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
5
• Hagen (2015)a
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Hurwitz and Sade (2017)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
6
• Benartzi, Previtero and Thaler (2011)
• Brown and Previtero (2014)
• Chalmers and Reuter (2012)
• Clark et al. (2014)
• Lee (2016)
• Previtero (2014)
Age 8 7 7
Stated preferences 4
• Brown et al. (2017a)
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
3
• Beshears et al. (2014)
• Shu et al. (2018)
• Teppa (2011)
4
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 4
• Bernheim (1991)
• Clark et al. (2014)
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Hurwitz and Sade (2017)
4
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Previtero (2014)a
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
3
• Benartzi et al. (2011)
• Brown and Previtero (2014)
• Lee (2016)
Non-white 0 1 1
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 1
• Brown (2001)
1
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
Education 0 14 3
Stated preferences 0 8 2
• Beshears et al. (2014) • Bateman et al. (2017)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013) • Brown et al. (2017a)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Nosi et al. (2017)
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 6 1
• Brown (2001) • Inkmann et al. (2011)
• Hagen (2015)
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Previtero (2014)a
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
Income 1 9 4
Stated preferences 0 8 0
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Nosi et al. (2017)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 1 1 4
• Previtero (2014) • Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013) • Chalmers and Reuter (2012)
• Clark et al. (2014)
• Hagen (2015)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
(continued on next page)
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Table D10 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Home ownership 0 4 0
Stated preferences 0 2• Beshears et al. (2014)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
0
Revealed preferences 0 2
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
0
Wealth 1 5 9
Stated preferences 0 5
• Bateman et al. (2017)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
2
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
Revealed preferences 1
• Brown (2001)
0 7
• Bernheim (1991)
• Bütler et al. (2013)
• Bütler and Teppa (2007)
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
• Knoller, Kraut and Schoenmaekers (2016)
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
Children 1 12 0
Stated preferences 1
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
6
• Beshears et al. (2014)
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)b
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)b
0
Revealed preferences 0 6
• Bernheim (1991)b
• Bütler and Teppa (2007)
• Hagen (2015)b
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
0
Married 2 15 0
Stated preferences 0 9
• Bateman et al. (2017)
• Beshears et al. (2014)
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)c
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)
0
Revealed preferences 2
• Brown (2001)
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
6
• Bernheim (1991)c
• Bütler and Teppa (2007)c
• Hagen (2015)a
• Hurwitz and Sade (2017)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
0
(continued on next page)
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Table D10 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Bequest motive 1 5 1
Stated preferences 1
• Bateman et al. (2017)
4
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Shu et al. (2018)
• Teppa (2011)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
1
• Chou et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 1
• Brown (2001)
0
Subjective health 0 6 3
Stated preferences 0 5
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Shu et al. (2018)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
1
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 1
• Wuppermann (2017)
2
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Brown (2001)
Subjective longevity 1 7 4
Stated preferences 1
• Chou et al. (2016)
3
• Bateman et al. (2017)
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)
4
• Payne et al. (2013)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
• Teppa (2011)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 4
• Hurd and Panis (2006)
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
• Brown (2001)
0
Objective longevity 0 2 2
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 2
• Hurwitz and Sade (2017)de
• Wuppermann (2017)f
2
• Chalmers and Reuter (2012)f
• Lee (2016)d
Risk aversion 3 5 3
Stated preferences 3
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
• Knoller (2016)
• Shu et al. (2018)
4
• Agnew et al. (2008)a
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
3
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Schooley-Pettis and Worden (2013)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 1
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
0
Stock market participation 1 3 2
Stated preferences 1
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
2
• Chou et al. (2016)
• Guillemette et al. (2016)
1
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 1
• Inkmann et al. (2011)
1
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
Patience 0 0 4
Stated preferences 0 0 3
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 0 1
• Brown (2001)
(continued on next page)
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Table D10 (continued)
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Trust in insurers 0 1 1
Stated preferences 0 1
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
1
• Van der Cruijsen and Jonker (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 0 0
Financial literacy 2 4 4
Stated preferences 2
• Agnew et al. (2008)
• Chou et al. (2016)
4
• Bateman et al. (2017)
• Bockweg et al. (2016)
• Cappelletti et al. (2013)g
• Shu et al. (2018)
3
• Ai, Brockett, Golden and Zhu (2017)
• Brown et al. (2017a)
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
Revealed preferences 0 0 1
• Ziegelmeyer and Nick (2013)
Awareness 0 0 2
Stated preferences 0 0 2
• Ai et al. (2017)
• Brown et al. (2017b)
Revealed preferences 0 0 0
a Reports different associations in equivalent analyses and is therefore counted under “none”.
b Reports having children (or not) rather than number of children.
c Reports different association sfor married individuals compared to individuals that are single, divorced or widowed and is therefore counted under “none”.
d Reports ex-ante mortality.
e Reports different associations for two measures of ex-ante mortality and is therefore counted under “none”.
f Reports ex-post mortality.
g Reports different associations for three different measures of financial literacy and is therefore counted under “none”.
Table D11
Overview of findings by studies on contextual factors associated with annuity uptake.
Factor Association
Negative None Positive
Social benefits 1 2 0
Stated preferences 0 2
• Chou et al. (2016)a
• Schreiber and Weber (2016)
0
Revealed preferences 1
• Bernheim (1991)
0 0
Tax incentive 0 0 3
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 0 0 3
• Hagen (2015)
• Lee (2016)
• Pfarr and Schneider (2013)
Annuity equivalent worth 1 0 5
Stated preferences 0 0 0
Revealed preferences 1
• Chalmers and Reuter (2012)
0 5
• Brown (2001)
• Bütler et al. (2013)†
• Bütler and Teppa (2007)
• Clark et al. (2014)b
• Lee (2016)
(continued on next page)
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